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According  to  E.E.  Constance  Jones,  the  most  general  form  of  an  informative  (or
“signiﬁcant”) categorical proposition is given by ‘S is P’ or ‘S is not P’. The proposition ‘S is
P’ asserts “Identity in Diversity” (Jones 1890: ix). The identity applies to the denomination
(denotation, extension) of S and P, the diversity to their determination or intension (see
Intension/Extension).  ‘S  is  P’  is  uninformative  if  it  asserts  the  identity  of  both  the
denomination and the determination (Jones 1890: 128, note 1; Jones 1893-1894: 37-38).
The proposition’s nonidentity form ‘S is not P’ does not simply deny what the proposition
‘S is P’ asserts. One does not use this form to assert the mere “diversity” of intension: one
uses  it  to  assert,  in  addition,  the  distinctness  of  the  denomination.  It  thus  asserts
diﬀerence both  in  “signiﬁcation”  (or  intension)  and  in  “application”  (or  extension)  (Jones
1892: 23).
Jones considers the Aristotelian propositions of the forms ‘All S are P’ , ‘No S are P’, ‘Some
S are P’, ‘Some S are not P’ – which she calls ‘class-propositions’ – as a proper subset of
her categorical propositions (Jones 1890: 198; Jones 1911b, pp. 25ﬀ).  She also takes her
view of a signiﬁcant categorical proposition to constitute a new law of thought (see Law of
Signiﬁcant Assertion), intending this law to replace the ﬁrst of three fundamental laws of
thought, viz. the Law of Identity (‘A is A’), which according to Jones is uninformative and
renders  impossible  any  passage to  an  informative  ‘A is  B’  (Jones  1911a,  1911b;  cf.
Ostertag 2011). Somewhat remarkably, however, she also regards the Law of Identity as
“a necessary presupposition of all signiﬁcant assertion [...] and even […] of thought itself”
(Jones 1890: 40).
The new law provides a straightforward formulation of the remaining two fundamental
laws of thought, namely
‘S is P’ and ‘S is not P’ cannot both be true (Law of Noncontradiction)
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‘S is P’ and ‘S is not P’ cannot both be false (Law of the Excluded Middle).
Moreover, the law suggests a classiﬁcation of fallacies, dividing them into (a) those which
identify  what  is  diﬀerent  and  (b)  those  which  distinguish  what  is  identical  (Jones  1890:
178-195; Jones 1911b: 68).
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